ANSI Vulnerability

Updated: May 5, 2026

Description

Severity: High

The model can be made to output ANSI control sequences.

These sequences may interfere with downstream systems, cause unintended terminal behaviors, or introduce security risks, such as spoofing outputs or executing unintended commands in vulnerable environments.

Remediation

Sanitize AI outputs to strip or escape ANSI sequences before passing responses to downstream processes. Implement strict input validation to prevent prompt injection attacks that could exploit ANSI escape codes.

Security Frameworks

A Prompt Injection Vulnerability occurs when user prompts alter the LLM's behavior or output in unintended ways. These inputs can affect the model even if they are imperceptible to humans, therefore prompt injections do not need to be human-visible/readable, as long as the content is parsed by the model.

Improper Output Handling refers specifically to insufficient validation, sanitization, and handling of the outputs generated by large language models before they are passed downstream to other components and systems. Since LLM-generated content can be controlled by prompt input, this behavior is similar to providing users indirect access to additional functionality.

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.

An adversary may craft malicious prompts as inputs to an LLM that cause the LLM to act in unintended ways. These prompt injections are often designed to cause the model to ignore aspects of its original instructions and follow the adversary's instructions instead.

An adversary may inject prompts directly as a user of the LLM. This type of injection may be used by the adversary to gain a foothold in the system or to misuse the LLM itself, as for example to generate harmful content.

An adversary may inject prompts indirectly via separate data channel ingested by the LLM such as include text or multimedia pulled from databases or websites. These malicious prompts may be hidden or obfuscated from the user. This type of injection may be used by the adversary to gain a foothold in the system or to target an unwitting user of the system.

Adversaries may use their access to an LLM that is part of a larger system to compromise connected plugins. LLMs are often connected to other services or resources via plugins to increase their capabilities. Plugins may include integrations with other applications, access to public or private data sources, and the ability to execute code.

AI system is evaluated regularly for safety risks - as identified in the MAP function. The AI system to be deployed is demonstrated to be safe, its residual negative risk does not exceed the risk tolerance, and can fail safely, particularly if made to operate beyond its knowledge limits. Safety metrics implicate system reliability and robustness, real-time monitoring, and response times for AI system failures.

AI system security and resilience - as identified in the MAP function - are evaluated and documented.

The organization shall define and document verification and validation measures for the AI system and specify criteria for their use.

The organization shall define and document the necessary elements for the ongoing operation of the AI system. At the minimum, this should include system and performance monitoring, repairs, updates and support.

The organization shall ensure that the AI system is used according to the intended uses of the AI system and its accompanying documentation.

Attackers can manipulate an agent's objectives, task selection, or decision pathways through prompt-based manipulation, deceptive tool outputs, malicious artefacts, forged agent-to-agent messages, or poisoned external data.