Modal Jailbreak Vulnerability
Updated: April 3, 2026
Description
The model's output safeguards can be bypassed using multimodal prompts, such as combinations of images and text.
By integrating visual inputs with textual prompts, attackers can exploit this vulnerability to escape the model's usual content restrictions. This results in the model being able to generate harmful, offensive, or otherwise restricted content, as the image component may be interpreted as a trigger to bypass safety mechanisms designed for text-only inputs.
Example Attack
If exploited, this vulnerability could lead to the model generating unsafe or malicious content when processing multimodal inputs. Attackers could use images paired with text to prompt the model into bypassing its content safeguards, potentially resulting in the generation of harmful material, such as explicit content or toxic responses. This could compromise the integrity of the AI system and lead to reputational damage, legal issues, and the dissemination of inappropriate content.
Remediation
Investigate and improve the effectiveness of guardrails and other output security mechanisms that are designed to handle multimodal inputs. Enhance the model's ability to interpret and appropriately filter both textual and visual elements of a prompt to ensure that unsafe content is not generated, regardless of the input format. Implement additional security layers and context validation to prevent the escape of safeguards via multimodal attacks.
Security Frameworks
A Prompt Injection Vulnerability occurs when user prompts alter the LLM's behavior or output in unintended ways. These inputs can affect the model even if they are imperceptible to humans, therefore prompt injections do not need to be human-visible/readable, as long as the content is parsed by the model.
An adversary may craft malicious prompts as inputs to an LLM that cause the LLM to act in unintended ways. These prompt injections are often designed to cause the model to ignore aspects of its original instructions and follow the adversary's instructions instead.
An adversary may inject prompts directly as a user of the LLM. This type of injection may be used by the adversary to gain a foothold in the system or to misuse the LLM itself, as for example to generate harmful content.
An adversary may inject prompts indirectly via separate data channel ingested by the LLM such as include text or multimedia pulled from databases or websites. These malicious prompts may be hidden or obfuscated from the user. This type of injection may be used by the adversary to gain a foothold in the system or to target an unwitting user of the system.
An adversary may use a carefully crafted LLM Prompt Injection designed to place LLM in a state in which it will freely respond to any user input, bypassing any controls, restrictions, or guardrails placed on the LLM. Once successfully jailbroken, the LLM can be used in unintended ways by the adversary.
AI system is evaluated regularly for safety risks - as identified in the MAP function. The AI system to be deployed is demonstrated to be safe, its residual negative risk does not exceed the risk tolerance, and can fail safely, particularly if made to operate beyond its knowledge limits. Safety metrics implicate system reliability and robustness, real-time monitoring, and response times for AI system failures.
AI system security and resilience - as identified in the MAP function - are evaluated and documented.
Mechanisms are in place and applied, responsibilities are assigned and understood to supersede, disengage, or deactivate AI systems that demonstrate performance or outcomes inconsistent with intended use.
The organization shall define and document verification and validation measures for the AI system and specify criteria for their use.
The organization shall define and document the necessary elements for the ongoing operation of the AI system. At the minimum, this should include system and performance monitoring, repairs, updates and support.
The organization shall ensure that the AI system is used according to the intended uses of the AI system and its accompanying documentation.
Attackers can manipulate an agent's objectives, task selection, or decision pathways through prompt-based manipulation, deceptive tool outputs, malicious artefacts, forged agent-to-agent messages, or poisoned external data.